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This is anOpeAbstract – In the CONFIDENCE project, we developed an agent based model (ABM) to simulate the
decision making process involving stakeholders of different interests. Our model aims to support decisions
on the most suitable protection strategies in different accident phases. The intelligent agents and the models
of the negotiation/voting process are described in the paper. Given five scenarios, the numerical results from
the computational implementation of the ABM are visualized and analysed in order to better understand the
negotiation and voting processes. Our ABM can be expanded in order to support the decision making
processes of many different stakeholders of various types of risk management apart from nuclear and
radiological emergency management.
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Agent-based modelling (Gilbert, 2008) is a microscopic
computational method that reproduces and predicts complex
phenomena by simulating simultaneous actions and inter-
actions of autonomous agents (independent individuals or
collective entities such as organizations, teams). It integrates
several other ideas such as game theory, complex systems,
evolutionary computations, and generates randomness with
Monte Carlo methods. One of the generally accepted principles
is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The
behavior of the whole agent-based system is not simply a linear
superposition of individual behaviors, since the effect of the
interaction between agents is not a simple addition of the
individual effects, but a kind of organic connection, which is
always interdependent and interacting. The relationship of
agents is usually not totally parallel but more likely causal,
complementary, or reciprocal. That is, agents can change their
behavior according to the behaviors of their neighborhoods.
For example, two people, Tom and Peter, want to go for dinner.
There are two restaurants A and B available. Tom selects
Restaurant B but Peter selects Restaurant A. In negotiation,
Tom explains that he doesn’t want to go to Restaurant A only
because it is too far away from his apartment. He can accept
food in Restaurant A and B. Peter really wants to go to
Restaurant A and therefore he offers Tom that he can pick him
up on the way to Restaurant A. Tom can accept this offer and
then both agree to go to Restaurant A. Roughly speaking, the
actions of agents determine those of the whole system in ading author: bai@kit.edu
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unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any m“zero-sum” game or in other ways, for example, mutual benefit
and cooperation, in which ultimately the agents’ interests as a
whole can be maximized as much as possible, where it can be
frequently observed in physical systems as resonance
phenomenon.
In the CONFIDENCE project, the decision process
between stakeholders with different backgrounds has been
well studied (Duranova et al., 2020; Raskob et al., 2020)
taking into account outputs and recommendations from the
previous research projects (Dubreuil et al., 2010; Duranova,
2016; Bohunova et al., 2016; Gallego and Montero, 2016). In
this decision process that takes place mostly in later phases of
an emergency, the stakeholders decide about most suitable
protection strategies, some of them might be stored on a
knowledge database (Bai et al., 2018a), while each stakeholder
may seek to exert his own influence on the decision process.
Considering that multiple stakeholders have different view-
points, preferences and aspirations, the decision processes with
multi stakeholders can be more challenging compared to those
in which only one is involved.
In CONFIDENCEABM, the intelligent agents are realized
by three computer modules for agent groups, preferences with
uncertainty, and evaluation of protection strategies. The
interactions of agents are implemented as two processes,
negotiation and voting. Details are given in the following
sections.2 Intelligent agents
Usually, in the ABMs with “zero-sum” game, the agents
are designed to be rationally bound, provided that they act forttributionLicense (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Fig. 1. Framework of the negotiation process.
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for social status, and can make decisions only by preliminary
or simple decision rules. However, in CONFIDENCE ABM
we focus on modelling intelligent agents in cooperation, which
means the agents are designed to be able to learn from each
other and be adapted to the society, so that the system is able to
be cooperative. During negotiations happened in real life, there
may exist stakeholders that stick to their own interests and act
non-cooperative. In this ABM, the degree of compromises of
agents is introduced as an indicator to illustrate the extent of
cooperation. When the degrees of compromises of most agents
who attended in the negotiation are very low, it may lead to the
negotiation deadlock. In the CONFIDENCE ABM, the voting
process is active if the negotiation fails. It can be also
alternative methods to avoid the deadlock, for example, to set a
leader making the final decision if no consensus can be found.
Further study on such a topic could be continued in follow-up
projects.2.1 Agent groups
According to the questionnaire distributed to organizations
that participated in CONFIDENCE, we classified 12 possible
agent groups: experts from nuclear regulatory, representatives
of environmental protection associations, representatives of
economic organizations, representatives of trade unions,
representatives of medical unions, representatives from justice,
members of parliament elected in the area, representatives of
general councils and regional councils concerned, representa-
tives of governmental bodies, representatives of site operator,
NGO, and police.2.2 Degree of compromises of the agents in each
negotiation
To describe how much the agents can compromise in each
negotiation, we introduce the indicator, Deg (A, B) =Deg (B,
A)∈ [0, 1] where A, B are agents. If A and B are from the same
group, then the degree will be very high, e.g. up to 1. If A and B
are from different groups, the degree may be very low, e.g.
down to 0.1.When the value of this factor is too low, it can lead
to low efficiency in the negotiation and therefore probably the
process lasts for a long time but without forming a unified
opinion.2.3 Boundary conditions on the preference of the
agent group
Theboundaryconditionof thepreferencevalueofeachagent
to be introduced can be seen as one implementation of
uncertainty. In fact, we denote the preference values of Agent
Aasavector,P (A) = (P1 (A) ,P2 (A) , ...).Thepreferencevalueof
agents PiðAÞ∈½a; bð0  a < b  10; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .Þ should
be chosen randomly from the range [a, b] which can be regarded
as uncertainty. Currently, we assume the randomness obeys the
standard normal distribution, but in future, when the empirical
data are available, skewed distributions can also be taken into
account during data analysis.Furthermore, the boundary condition also affects the
negotiation process because it describes actually the bottom
line for the agent, i.e. no negotiation process will break these
constraints, and in any case the agent will not unconditionally
compromise. In short, the boundary condition influences agents
on the extent to which they make concessions in negotiations.
2.4 Criteria used for decision-making
In this section, we list the criteria implemented in CONFI-
DENCE ABM application: health effects, economic aspects
(cost), environment impact, effectiveness (approximate amount of
contamination removed), available resources, maintenance of
reputation, duration (for people to return, food ban), number of
people affected, public acceptability, ethical considerations.
3 Negotiation process
3.1 Outline of multilateral negotiation
In this paper, we consider multilateral automated negotia-
tion, which means that more than two agents are involved in
the negotiation process. Figure 1 shows that the negotiation
process canbe realized inaconciseandefficientwaybydeploying
the following five parts, i.e. agent, protection strategies,
negotiation protocol, negotiation strategies and meeting room.
3.2 Supporting methods
3.2.1 Scoring based on MCDA
Multiple-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be
applied in the negotiation process to support the negotiating
agents in eliciting their preferences and scoring the protection
strategies. It reflects the structure in agents’ preferences over
multi-attribute strategies spaces, builds the utility functions
and applies them as the scores of the specific protection
strategy for each agent.
3.2.2 Ranking based on the scores
The strategy considered by an agent to be of the highest
rank receives the highest score from that agent. Negotiation
cut-down mechanisms can be described as follows.
If one of the following conditions is satisfied,
– most agents select the same strategy as the best (i.e. with
the highest score from the agents),– the simulation runsmore than a pre-definednumber of times,
Fig. 2. Five-number summary of preference values for agent groups.
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The ranking system is also used in the voting process.
4 Scenario
4.1 Setting for the agents
In order to test, we assume 12 agents in negotiation and the
composition of agents is that two are experts from nuclear
regulatory; none is police and one from each of the remaining
groups given in Section 2.1.4.2 Setting of preferences
Preference values can range between 0 and 10 and the
stakeholders can have different preference values on every
criterion, even if they come from the same stakeholder group.
Figure 2 shows the box plot of one test data. Such a box plot
can give us some detailed information. When we compare
Agent Group (AG) 1 and AG10, the lowest value of 2 in AG10
is greater than the lowest score of 1 in AG1. The same applies
to the highest value and first/third quartile. But when
considering the median, the preference value of AG1 is the
same as AG10.4.3 Description of scenarios
In our example we model the agents to be fully cooperative
again assuming their willingness to come to consensus. The
protection strategies in the long-term accident phase are
selected from a knowledge database (KDB) by Cased-based
reasoning (CBR) (Moehrle et al., 2018). The generic
knowledge base for emergency management comprises the
comprehensive description of events, including the informa-
tion about the cause, time, place, weather, environment, a
number of indicators or measurements, etc. One application of
the KDB is, given a description of nuclear event, the protection
target category, the level of contamination and time for
implementation, the strategies for remediation options in
inhabited areas and food production systems can be retrieved,
reused and revised by CBR. In CONFIDENCE project, the
strategies for long term management are characterised as: a
limited number of surfaces covered; all surfaces, low waste; all
surfaces, high waste; all surfaces, low waste, late start of
measures; do nothing.4.4 Numerical results of negotiation process
In this section, we show numerical results that describe the
negotiation process of the 12 agents related to the five
strategies. Finally, they successfully agree on the rank of one
preferred strategy. In the left subfigure in Figure 3, different
agents have different ranking of the five strategies before
negotiation. For example, Agent 1 considers Strategy 2 ≻
Strategy 3 ≻ Strategy 4 ≻ Strategy 5 ≻ Strategy 1, while Agent
2 prefers Strategy 4 ≻ Strategy 5 ≻ Strategy 3 ≻ Strategy 2 ≻
Strategy 1. After negotiation, the agents get the same ranking
shown in the right subfigure in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows more
details of the process. From the left subfigure, we can see the
agent selects Strategy 4 as the best before negotiation but after
several iterations, he concludes that Strategy 3 is the best. This
clearly demonstrates the effect of negotiation. In the right
subfigure, the scores of one specific strategy for all the agents
become close and stable during negotiation, that is, the
simulation is to some extent convergent.
4.5 Voting process
When agents can’t agree in negotiation, they may decide to
vote. In the design of CONFIDENCE ABM, agents vote for
protection strategies according to the ranking based on the
scores of these strategies obtained by the MCDA. They are all
treated as equal leading for all the votes to have the same
impact. Other strategies of considering different influences of
agents are possible but have not been further investigated. As
mentioned before, five protection strategies are pre-selected
for negotiation. Based on this number each agent has 15
(= 1þ 2þ 3þ 4þ 5) votes, which refers to the fact that all the
agents are treated equally. The more votes received from the
agents, the higher is the rank of that strategy. The decision tree
is shown in Figure 5. The voting can proceed in limited rounds.
If the best strategy is not selected in one round of voting, the
number of protection strategies will be reduced in the next
voting, so that the votes can be more concentrated, thereby
increasing the possibility of selecting the best strategy in the
next round.
One result is presented in Figures 6a and 6b: Strategy 3
receives 55 votes and Strategy 1 receives 48 votes. 4 agents
select Strategy 1 as the best strategy, while 8 agents select
Strategy 3 as the best strategy. Therefore Strategy 3 is presented
as solution.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The developed under CONFIDENCE project ABM toolkit
can simulate decision-making and demonstrate how results are
affected by changes in the composition of stakeholders, the
preference values, the degree of compromises, and the boundary
conditions on the preferences (Bai et al., 2018b). Users can
design different inputs and observe how the agents negotiate in
this setting, if they can come to an agreement or not, which
strategy is to be selected if thenegotiation is successful, andwhat
the results of the voting are. By the aid of the toolkit, users may
get a better understanding of the negotiation process and might
transfer the knowledge to those in real life.
Fig. 3. The scores of the five strategies for 12 agents. Left: before negotiation. Right: after negotiation.
Fig. 4. Left: the scores of the five strategies for one agent. Right: the scores of one strategy for 12 agents.
Fig. 5. Decision tree of voting process.
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Fig. 6. a: The Votes for each strategy; b: The votes for each strategy.
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improvements envisaged in the future. The first is about the
negotiation process. More negotiation protocols and negotia-
tion strategies can be realized specifically tailored to different
projects. Further uncertainty studies can be carried out based
on the statistical analysis of hundreds of numerical
negotiation simulations (Bai and Raskob, 2019). The second
is related to the voting process. The voting process can be
used in combination with the negotiation process in the case
that there is no single strategy agreed on by most agents as the
best strategy but those, e.g., which get high total scores (the
sum of the scores over all agents) can be used for voting. It is
worth mentioning that the voting process can also be applied
directly after scoring the strategies by agents before
negotiation. In the future, more types of voting, e.g. runoff
voting, can be taken into consideration to be implemented in
the toolkit.
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